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Abstract. In this article, we review the challenges to the current economic 
system and then proceed by presenting two competing paradigms—the 
economistic and humanistic paradigms of business. We then develop the 
consequences of the humanistic view for the theory and practice of the firm 
with regard to global sustainability. We examine paradigmatic differences 
regarding business strategy, governance structures, leadership styles, and 
organizational culture, and illustrate them based on global case examples. 
In this manner, we contribute to the discussion of alternative theories for 
global sustainability, centering the debate on authentic human needs and 
the consequences of such for management theory.
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Management theory and practice are facing unprecedented chal-
lenges. The lack of sustainability, increasing inequity, and the continuous 
decline in societal trust pose a threat to “business as usual” (Jackson & 
Nelson, 2004: 214). Capitalism is at a crossroads, and scholars, practitio-
ners, and policy makers are called to rethink business strategy in light of 
major external changes (Arena, 2004; Hart, 2005). Management theory 
and practice have historically been based on the scienti!c precepts of 
economics (Ghoshal, 2005; Mintzberg, Simons, & Basu, 2002). As a result, 
business is oriented towards shareholder value maximization, individual 
motivation is explained by income maximization, and economic success 
is de!ned by societal-level GDP increases (Pirson & Lawrence, 2010). 
Utilitarian arguments have been used to legitimize this theoretical ori-
entation as a way to maximize societal bene!ts (Jensen, 2002). In turn, 
many scholars have criticized current market capitalism for decreasing 
the societal legitimacy of business (Scherer, Palazzo, & Seidl, 2013) and 
ultimately jeopardizing human survival (Hart, 2005; Senge, 2010).
As many scholars suggest, we are currently experiencing a paradig-
matic crisis (Anderson, 1998; Dierksmeier, 2011; Mintzberg et al., 2002). 
In this article, we wish to take a step back and delineate the current 
economistic paradigm more directly. While such an endeavor risks over-
simpli!cation, we think that the conceptual clarity it provides outweighs 
such risks, especially since we can develop an alternative paradigm based 
on such simpli!ed and theoretical precepts. We label the alternative 
paradigm the humanistic paradigm, as it factors in the complexity of hu-
man nature and emphasizes the human being and its will to protect the 
species in the long term. We argue that a humanistic paradigm provides 
a basis for theorizing about sustainable business practice.
Picture a bank that serves those in need, such as Wainwright Bank or 
Grameen Bank, or a coffee roaster ensuring fair trade, e.g., level trading, 
or a yogurt company serving malnourished children, such as Grameen 
Danone, or a company combating deserti!cation with sustainable ag-
riculture, such as SEKEM. These are not charitable organizations, but 
they aim to provide societal value through their core business models. 
Such are the realities of business that are often overlooked. As current 
management theory is largely informed by economics, it draws substan-
tively from neoclassical theories about human beings (Ghoshal, 2005). 
Accordingly, humans are materialistic utility maximizers that value 
individual bene!t over group and societal bene!t. Such a perspective, 
however, can only poorly explain why individuals would care enough to 
build businesses such as those mentioned above. A “homo oeconomicus” 
engages with others only in a transactional manner to ful!ll his or her 
interests. He/she is amoral, values short term grati!cation, and often 
acts opportunistically to further personal gain. Theories of the !rm 
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and ensuing business strategies as well as of organizational designs have 
been based largely on economic assumptions, and, in turn, are blamed 
by others for creating negative externalities (Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal & 
Moran, 1996). Argyris (1973), for example, claims that organizational 
mechanisms based on principal-agent theory create opportunistic and 
short-term gain oriented actors in a self-ful!lling prophecy (see also 
Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Other critical scholars argue 
that management theory needs to be rethought based on psychological 
insights rather than theoretical assumptions (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 
2003). We therefore suggest that we need a broader way of understand-
ing human beings upon which we can prescribe a renewed theory of 
sustainable business practice, one that allows us to better understand 
leadership and management, design our organizations, and formulate 
business strategy.
In the following sections, we will thus review why we need a new 
basis for sustainable business practice, and proceed by presenting two 
competing paradigms—the economistic and the humanistic paradigms of 
business. We will then develop the consequences of the humanistic view 
for the theory of the !rm, business strategy, governance structures, lead-
ership styles, and organizational culture. Afterwards, we will outline the 
tenets of humanistic management, and illustrate them based on global 
case examples. In this manner, we hope to contribute to the discussion 
of alternative theories of the !rm by centering the debate on authentic 
human needs and the consequences of such for management theory.
CURRENT CHALLENGES TO SHAREHOLDER CAPITALISM
With the increasing severity of a multitude of crises, it becomes ever 
more evident that the dominating Anglo-Saxon model of sharehold-
er-centered capitalism falls short with regard to its sustainability and 
life-conduciveness on a systemic, organizational, and individual level 
(Spitzeck, Pirson, Amann, Khan, & Kimakowitz, 2009).
The Systemic Level
Environmental destruction is one of the most obvious problems of 
our current system. Overall, humanity is currently using the productive 
capacity of more than 1.3 planets to satisfy its needs.1 If everybody on 
this planet were to consume natural resources at the rate of an average 
1http://wwf.panda.org/about_our_earth/all_publications/living_planet_report/
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American, more than 4 planets would be required.2 The current economy 
uses more resources than can be replenished, leading to unsustainable 
growth and further economic bubbles. In !nancial terms, we are living 
off our planetary capital and not the interest generated by it, which is 
very poor management of resources. This lack of sustainability is, how-
ever, supported by the logic of our current system. Shareholder capitalism 
is short-term oriented and, when applied rigorously, rewards plundering 
over preserving.
Increasing inequality is another problem that is likely to have sig-
ni!cant repercussions on the stability of our political and economic 
systems. Current trends in globalization have led to a world in which the 
rich get richer and the poor get disproportionately poorer (Sachs, 2005). 
One-sixth of the world’s population lives in extreme poverty. The level 
of poverty and inequality pricks the conscience of many people, and it 
is also a threat to the stability of the rest of the world. Political unrest, 
collectivization, and terrorism are fed by such inequality, which requires 
signi!cant investments in preserving the status quo (see increased se-
curity budgets) rather than in innovation. Shareholder capitalism is 
mostly blind to these consequences and has not yet provided satisfactory 
answers to deal with these issues.
The Organizational Level
At the organizational level, businesses face the challenge of low repu-
tation levels and ever decreasing stakeholder trust (e.g., World Economic 
Forum, 2006). Trust, however, is commonly viewed as the key enabler 
for cooperation, motivation, and innovation, all of which are required 
to achieve an organization’s peak performance and its eventual success. 
Surveys indicate that stakeholder trust in businesses is decreasing dra-
matically, speci!cally in large and global shareholder value maximizing 
companies. Research !nds that the decline in trust is heavily contingent 
upon a lack of value congruency between stakeholders and the organiza-
tion (Pirson, 2007; Pirson & Malhotra, 2008, 2011). Pro!t maximization 
goals are perceived as inherently opportunistic, which makes it ever 
more dif!cult for the business community to re-establish trust (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2004; Pirson, 2007; Simons, 2002).
We observe that many corporations are facing a decreasing level 
of employee commitment which is indicative of the growing lack of 
mutual commitment. The Hay Group (2002), for example, !nds that 
2http://www.personal.psu.edu/afr3/blogs/siowfa12/2012/10/if-everyone-lived-
liked-americans-how-many-earths-would-we-need.html
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43% of American employees are either neutral or negative towards their 
workplace. According to several Gallup studies, more than 70% of U.S. 
employees are either not engaged or actively disengaged, showing an 
alarming inner withdrawal rate. Jensen (2001: 278) argues that the goal 
of profit maximization is partially responsible for this. He posits as 
self-evident that creating “value takes more than acceptance of value 
maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corpo-
rate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the 
energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers to create value.” 
Hence, shareholder value maximizing organizations are under-utilizing 
their employees’ potential.
The Individual Level
On the individual level, we observe an interesting anomaly. While 
the current system is credited with creating more wealth for many, the 
average level of life satisfaction has not necessarily increased (Easterlin, 
2001). GDP growth and growth in well-being have decoupled. Factors 
that contribute to well-being have a relatively low correlation with mate-
rial wealth once a certain wealth level has been achieved (Diener & Selig-
man, 2004). From a systemic perspective, the quality of a government 
in terms of democratic and human rights, the level of corruption, the 
stability of the system, high social capital, a strong economy with low 
rates of unemployment, and in!ation all contribute to subjective well-
being. On an individual level, the quality of social relationships, good 
physical and mental health, and a generally positive attitude towards life 
are central drivers of well-being. Materialism as an attitude, for example, 
is considered toxic for well-being (Diener & Seligman, 2004; Elias, 2002). 
The current system, however, largely sustains itself by serving material 
needs that lie beyond those that increase well-being, and by an endless 
attempt to generate new needs, which can in turn only be satis"ed by 
the unsustainable use of available resources.
THE PROBLEM OF AN ECONOMISTIC PARADIGM
The above problems are created and sustained by the way we think 
about people, management, and business. The current economistic para-
digm puts economic motives not alongside but above all other objectives 
of human action—and in consequence often bars other concerns, e.g., 
moral and cultural viewpoints, as illegitimate in theory and irrelevant in 
practice (see Ashley, 1983; Gasper, 2004). While it represents a powerful 
and simple way to think about life, the economistic paradigm is seriously 
!awed and could prove suicidal (Pirson & Lawrence, 2010).
Michael Pirson & Ernst von Kimakowitz22
Origins of Economism
The discipline of economics originated from Scottish moral phi-
losophy during the European Enlightenment. In contrast to prevailing 
philosophy that focused on deity, Scottish moral philosophy centered on 
the human individual (Nida-Ruemelin, 2008). It emphasized the human 
ability to reason and was therefore hostile to collectivist and naturalistic 
anthropologies. Classical economic theory was similar in this regard 
and was also closely bound to utilitarianism (Nida-Ruemelin, 2008). 
Jeremy Bentham (1879), one of the founding fathers of utilitarianism, 
tried to create rational normative criteria for good legislation where ev-
ery single person was considered equal, independent from social status 
and origin. John Stuart Mill, one of the leading economic theoreticians, 
was both a utilitarian and an ethicist at the same time. However, while 
economics and ethics were originally closely linked, they gradually 
became disconnected. Following Nida-Ruemelin’s (2008) analysis, utili-
tarianism had several !aws that eventually led to the de-ethicalization 
(or de-moralization) of economics. Despite its liberal, universalist, and 
rationalist origins, utilitarian principles can, in fact, be used to justify 
collectivist practices: “To maximize the total sum of happiness ef"ciently 
can include the instrumentalization of one person for the sake of one or 
several others. Under certain conditions even slavery can be justi"ed by 
utilitarian principles” (p. 10). In addition, utilitarianism does not provide 
an understanding of inalienable individual rights, and thus enables the 
instrumentalization of human beings. Integrity and morality are not 
considered intrinsic to human beings.
The Economistic View of the Individual
As stated before, economism views the human being as a "xed entity, 
predetermined by a stable utility function. This economic man (homo 
oeconomicus) is utterly self-serving and interested only in maximizing 
his immediate utility. The economic man, therefore, engages only in 
transactional, short-term oriented encounters with others. His engage-
ments are interest-based, and other people are a means to an end. He 
acts opportunistically and is mainly motivated by the lower level needs 
in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs (physiological and safety needs). His ac-
tions are not evaluated for universal applicability, and hence he is amoral 
(Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2010).3
3We are aware that the notion of economic man has been enlarged and adapted. 
Most notably, Jensen and Meckling promote the model of REMM as a better fit version of 
economic man (one who is not only maximizing money). However, the main postulates 
of limitless needs (wants) and of maximization remain.
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The Economistic View of the Firm
In a purely economistic view, organizations are not needed, as the 
market would suf!ce to coordinate individuals in their maximization of 
!xed utility functions. Utilitarianism fails to explain why and how co-
operation is needed, as economic men with similar preconceived utility 
functions need only coordination (Nida-Ruemelin, 2008). Nevertheless, 
based on some additional assumptions, namely transaction costs and 
bounded rationality, humans are thought to engage in cooperation only 
when the market provides sub-optimally ef!cient results.
Business Strategy. The organizations that are based on the notions 
of homo oeconomicus are designed to !t the maximization imperative. An 
optimal way to ensure utility maximization is for organizational lead-
ership to focus only on shareholder interest. In his refutation of stake-
holder theory, Jensen (2002) argues that there has to be a single objective 
function for the !rm; otherwise, one could not purposefully manage it. 
He bases this claim on assumptions of economic theory, which posit that 
pro!t maximization strategies are required in situations where there are 
no externalities. “Two hundred years of work in economics and !nance 
implies [sic] that in the absence of externalities and monopoly (and when 
all goods are priced), social welfare is maximized when each !rm in an 
economy maximizes its total market value” (p. 2).
Externalities, however, are very real, negative, drastic, and persistent, as 
can be witnessed in the environmental crisis as well as in the social ineq-
uity crisis. Monopolies are also very real without aggressive anti-trust en-
forcement, and so it is clear that the economistic setup is sub-optimal.
Governance. The governance notions in the economistic setting are 
largely informed by agency theory. In order to maintain total control in 
the hands of ownership, agency theory governance mechanisms focus 
on creating an environment where opportunistic, self–serving manage-
rial agents are in check to not harm the ful!llment of whatever goal the 
owners intend to ful!ll. Top-down control mechanisms are essential to 
the governance structure of economistic organizations, since otherwise 
self-interested economistic managers will abuse the !rm.
Structures. Structures in the economistic paradigm have to serve the 
maximization strategy and are ef!ciency oriented. To reduce transaction 
costs, the organizational structure is centered on hierarchies and top-
down decision-making. In economistic organizations, incentive systems 
are central. They are an important structural element for aligning di-
verging interests and the only way to effectively deal with opportunistic 
agents. These economistic incentives are mainly monetary in nature 
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(such as !nancial bonuses) and targeted at the individual. The incentives 
are also short-term oriented because they are based mostly on annual 
(oftentimes quarterly) !nancial results.
Leadership. In the economistic view, the organization is generally 
seen as a nexus of contracts that is continuously negotiated. The role of 
the leader requires being involved in a constant negotiation process and 
the task is to clarify goals and desired outcomes with followers. Bass and 
Avolio (1994) call the economistic type of leader a transactional leader. 
The transactional leader is primarily involved in ensuring compliance 
and setting incentives so that followers deliver. Nurturing quality long-
term relationships is rather irrelevant and oftentimes hindering (hiring 
and !ring, for example, is a capacity that requires leaders to be emotion-
ally disconnected from followers). Followers are considered mainly as 
human resources (not human beings), and a skillful transactional leader 
is one that is ef!ciency maximizing.
Culture. Economistic organizations support cultures and organiza-
tional identities that are oriented mostly towards the individual (Brick-
son, 2007). These cultures are also often described as transactional in 
nature (Bass & Avolio, 1994). As a consequence, economistic organiza-
tions are following rather linear, mechanistic, and closed-loop thought 
and interaction processes (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2010). As Collier and 
Esteban (1999) argue, mechanistic organizations attempt to transform 
the environment “adversarially and competitively rather than seek to 
respond to it” (p. 176). Uncontrolled change is viewed as a threat because 
it interferes with the optimal implementation of the maximization 
paradigm. There is a need to control the outside and to manage and 
manipulate the environment, particularly government, in order to sup-
port !rm pro!tability (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2009).
The Economistic View of the Societal System
In an economistic view, the main function of the corporation is to 
accumulate wealth, whilst the main function of the state is to provide 
safety. In this division of labor, the state creates rules to coordinate orga-
nizations, and organizational leadership’s main responsibility is to obey 
those rules while maximizing pro!ts. These rules, however, are based 
on “laissez-faire” assumptions so that individuals and organizations 
can follow their respective utility functions. Any further commitment 
to societal causes is incompatible with individual- and organizational-
level utility maximization. Talk of responsibilities is generally viewed 
as systematic interference with liberty. Calls for corporate responsibility 
and sustainability are only heeded when they are compulsory and part 
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of the legal infrastructure. Voluntary engagement for societal issues such 
as equity and intergenerational justice do not !t with the economistic 
view unless they make strategic sense in terms of increasing material 
wealth (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2008).
A HUMANISTIC PARADIGM AS ALTERNATIVE
Despite many popular misconceptions, humanism as a philosophical 
tradition and utilitarian economism have very similar roots. Humanistic 
philosophy also takes the human individual as its starting point and 
emphasizes the human capacity of reasoning. It is therefore equally 
hostile to any form of collectivism.4 In contrast to economism, however, 
humanism assumes that human nature is not entirely a given, that it 
can be re!ned through education and learning. In addition, the ethical 
component remains a cornerstone in humanism in that it attributes 
inalienable rights and dignity to everyone, independent from ethnicity, 
nationality, social status, or gender. Humanism addresses everybody and 
is universal in its outreach.
The Humanistic View of the Individual
The philosophy of humanism views the individual as a zoon politikon 
(Aristotle), a relational (wo)man who materializes freedom through value-
based social interactions (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2009). People he or she 
engages with are means but also an end in themselves. Human beings in 
the humanistic view are guided by universally applicable principles and 
aim at long-term relationships. They are intrinsically motivated to self-
actualize and serve humanity through what they do. They do not have 
!xed preconceived utility functions, but their interests, needs, and wants 
take shape through discourse and continuous exchange with the outside 
world. Human beings as such do not maximize their own utility, but 
balance their interests and those of people around them in accordance 
with general moral principles (Dierksmeier & Pirson, 2008).
Recent scientif ic developments supporting the humanistic 
perspective. Humanism and economics have their traditions, but so far, 
no real test of these theoretical assumptions is possible. Lawrence and 
Nohria (2002), however, took up the task of evaluating recent !ndings 
4Collectivism here is defined as the theory and practice that makes some sort of 
group rather than the individual the fundamental unit of political, social, and economic 
concern. In theory, collectivists insist that the claims of groups, associations, or the 
state must normally supersede the claims of individuals.<LFN4>
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from neuroscience, behavioral economics, and evolutionary psychol-
ogy and developed a theory that allows for viewing human beings in 
a more complete fashion. Lawrence (2007b, 2010), in his most recent 
follow-up works, calls it a renewed Darwinian theory (RD theory) of hu-
man beings, referring to Darwin’s groundbreaking insights on human 
behavior that are often overlooked or misunderstood. In essence, RD 
theory illuminates how the human brain developed via natural selec-
tion as well as through sex and group selection mechanisms to make 
complex decisions regarding all aspects of life (personal, communal, and 
societal). It posits four basic and independent drives, ultimate motives 
that underlie all human decisions. There are two ancient drives which 
are shared by all animals that have some capacity to sense and evaluate 
their surroundings—the drive to acquire (dA) life-sustaining resources, 
and the drive to defend (dD) from all life-threatening entities. The two 
newer drives that evolved into an independent status in humans are 
the drive to bond (dB) in long-term mutually caring relationships with 
other humans, and the drive to comprehend (dC), to make sense of the 
world around us in terms of its multifaceted relations to ourselves. The 
posited independence of these drives contradicts the economist view 
in which all human motivation could be subsumed under the drive to 
acquire, with the drives to bond, comprehend, and defend merely play-
ing a supportive role.
The Drive to Acquire (dA). Lawrence (2010) argues that humans, in 
common with all animals, have a fundamental drive to get what they 
need to stay alive and have progeny: food, water, warmth, sex, etc. Mod-
ern neuroscience provides evidence to support the biological basis of 
the drive to acquire (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr, & Poldrack, 2008; Ridley, 
2003). Becerra et al. (2001), for example, have identi!ed an area in the 
brain called the nucleus acumbens which lights up with increased blood 
"ow when people and animals experience pleasurable sensations from 
objects they acquire, ranging from tasty food to the sight of a beautiful 
face. This drive is commonly acknowledged by much of economic and 
management theory (e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1994) as it is the basis for 
utility maximization.
The Drive to Defend (dD). Lawrence and Nohria (2002) claim that 
for most species, the drive to defend is a mirror image of the drive to 
acquire. What needs defending is what needed acquiring—food, water, 
warmth, mates, and so on. Carter and Frith (1998) present evidence that 
the drive to defend seems, like the other drives, to be housed in the 
limbic area of the brain, speci!cally in a module called the amygdala. 
They !nd that responses to stimuli will be either appeasement, "ight, 
or aggression, depending on what part of the amygdala is stimulated 
(pp. 90–91). Lawrence and Nohria (2002) further argue that for humans, 
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with their four drives, the drive to defend covers much more ground—
not only concerning the physical necessities of life and procreation, but 
also relationships, cooperative efforts, and the understanding of the 
world (see the idea of protected values [Baron & Spranca, 1997]). As with 
the drive to acquire, humans are able to satisfy their drive to defend 
in a huge variety of ways and oftentimes in cooperation with others 
(Lawrence, 2010).
The Drive to Bond (dB). Aristotle already hinted at the drive to bond 
when he stated that human beings are social animals (Dierksmeier & Pir-
son, 2009). Darwin (1909) further observed the drive to bond in humans 
when he wrote that everyone “will admit that man is a social being. We 
see this in his dislike of solitude and in his wish for society beyond that of 
his own family. Solitary con!nement is one of the severest punishments 
which can be in"icted” (p. 110), or, 
Under circumstances of extreme peril, as during a !re, when a man endeav-
ors to save a fellow-creature without a moment’s hesitation, he can hardly 
feel pleasure; and still less has the time to re"ect on the dissatisfaction which 
he might subsequently experience if he did not make the attempt. Should he 
afterwards re"ect over his own conduct, he would feel that there lies within 
him an impulsive power widely different from a search after pleasure or hap-
piness; and this seems to be the deeply planted social instinct. (p. 122)
Of course, we all have observed that people tend to form bonds with 
other people. Lawrence (2010), however, suggests that we need to reevalu-
ate this utterly familiar phenomenon not simply as “the way people are” 
or as “the innate goodness in people,” but as one of four survival oriented 
criteria. A number of experiments have offered evidence that there is 
an independent drive to bond supported by our brain. LeDoux (1996, 
2002), for example, found that when certain parts of the limbic area—the 
hypothalamus and anterior thalamus—are impaired, individuals have 
a dif!cult time forming any meaningful or stable social relationships. 
Similarly, Damasio (1994, 2003) suggests that brain damage in certain 
parts leaves people without emotions and without the ability to make 
rational decisions and form new bonds. In experiments that examined 
group bonding mechanisms, Tajfel (2010) found that a group of strangers, 
divided into arbitrary subgroups, formed surprisingly strong attachments 
to members of the same group, even if the group is completely meaning-
less and has no prior history together. To further support the innate and 
independent drive to bond, Warneken and Tomasello (2006) found that 
human infants (between 18 and 24 months old) show a spontaneous, 
unrewarded impulse to help others even when they seem too young to 
have emulated this behavior from adults. In these experiments, research-
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ers who were strangers to the toddlers accidentally dropped items and 
pretended to unsuccessfully reach for them. The children retrieved the 
items for the experimenter 89% of the time. Henrich et al. (2001) found 
that the value of fairness exists across cultures and that it trumps the 
drive to acquire in what is called the ultimatum game. Lawrence (2010) 
also argues that all humans, except the rare psychopath, experience pain 
at the loss of an important long-term relationship, whether by death, 
divorce, emigration, downsizing, or many other causes. In many cases, 
this pain is so deep that a mere reference to the drives to acquire and 
defend does not seem suf!cient. Emigration to the United States from 
a mother country in which one is not only doomed to poverty but also 
subject to violent persecution is, rationally speaking, a net gain in terms 
of maximizing self-interest, yet it will still cause deep and lasting grief 
(Lawrence, 2010: 34).
The Drive to Comprehend (dC). Aristotle observed the drive to 
comprehend when he quali!ed humans as social animals endowed with 
reason. Many scholars have suggested that humans have a fundamen-
tal drive to understand themselves and their environment (Lawrence 
& Nohria, 2002; Maslow, 1954; Weick, 1995; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2006). 
Gribbin and Gribbin (1995) refer to it as mankind’s insatiable curiosity. 
Darwin (1909) also referred to the drive to comprehend: “As soon as the 
important faculties of the imagination, wonder, and curiosity, together 
with some power of reasoning, had become partially developed, man 
would naturally crave to understand what was passing around him, and 
could have vaguely speculated on his own existence” (p. 95). Lawrence 
(2010) states that the drive to comprehend can be witnessed in the 
curiosity of children, who ask questions without knowing whether the 
answers will ever be of any use to them in ful!lling the other drives. 
Even newborns, once fed and secure, are exploring the world with their 
eyes and their hands. The popularity of puzzles, sudoku, or trivia quiz-
zes is also a testimony to the independent drive to comprehend, since 
solving them provides immediate grati!cation but only remotely serves 
in other terms. Another supporting argument is the fact that anthro-
pologists seem to have found not a single culture that does not have a 
creation story and few that do not have an afterlife story (Sproul, 1979). 
People seem to need these theories to give meaning to their lives (We-
ick, 1995; Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001), regardless of whether or not 
the stories confer any advantage in acquiring, bonding, and defending. 
Lawrence (2010) even argues that religions arose in all societies primarily 
to help ful!ll this drive. Pinker (2002) argues that the drive to compre-
hend has helped humans to survive against stronger and faster animals 
by devising weaponry, creating tools, and building houses. Moreover, 
increasing empirical evidence points to the physical existence of the 
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drive to comprehend in the brain as well. Biederman and Vessel (2006) 
found that a part of the brain which helps recognize what we see seems 
to be equipped with its own reward system of opiate receptors, which 
give a pleasurable “high” when stimulated by a new image (see also the 
emotional reaction to the eureka effect, or the joy of solving a sudoku 
puzzle). They also found that this pleasure response diminished when 
the same image was recognized repeatedly. As Biederman and Vessel see 
it, these opiate receptors get bored by repetition and need new stimula-
tion, which leads us to curiosity (e.g., Loewenstein, 1994). As Lawrence 
puts it, we are rewarded directly with pleasure for learning something 
new. Comprehending is independently rewarding, time and again, and 
only secondarily does this make us more competitive than species that 
do not keep learning (Biederman & Vessel, 2006).
Psychopathy: A Three-Drive Genetic Defect and Source of Bad 
Leadership. Lawrence (2010) argues that some people, over the history of 
human survival, did not develop the independent drive to bond. These 
people were asocial and were usually outcasts in society. They had been 
marginalized throughout evolution but never completely eradicated. In 
fact, it is estimated that about 1% of the population does lack that inde-
pendent drive to bond, causing what is otherwise known as psychopathy 
(Hare, 1999; Neumann & Hare, 2008). Hare describes psychopaths as 
“social predators who charm, manipulate, and ruthlessly plow their way 
through life, leaving a broad trail of broken hearts, shattered expecta-
tions, and empty wallets. Completely lacking in conscience and in feel-
ings for others, they sel!shly take what they want and do as they please, 
violating social norms and expectations without the slightest sense of 
guilt or regret” (1999: XI). They have “an insatiable appetite for power 
and control” (1999: 218) combined with “a deeply disturbing inability 
to care about the pain and suffering experienced by others—in short, a 
complete lack of empathy” (p. 6).
Researchers have identi!ed psychopaths (whom biologists and econo-
mists call “free-riders” and whom sociologists and some psychologists 
tend to call “sociopaths”) as people with a genetic defect (Weber, Habel, 
Amunts, & Schneider, 2008). They are incapable of empathy and have no 
skill set of conscience or morality (Cleckley, 1982). Their jaw-dropping 
sel!shness and lack of empathy does not come from exaggerated drives 
to acquire and defend; these drives are normal—which means they are 
innate, unconscious, independent, and insatiable—but are not checked 
and balanced by a drive to have trusting and caring relationships with 
others (Buckholtz et al., 2010). Lawrence (2010) describes them as wild 
animals—motivated mainly by the two universal animal drives—but 
with all the advantages of a human drive to comprehend.
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Hare estimates—conservatively, he insists—that “there are at least 
2 million psychopaths in North America; the citizens of New York City 
have as many as 100,000 psychopaths among them” (1999: 1–2). Babiak 
and Hare (2006) even argue that many of these psychopaths are able to 
gain in!uence and power and that the current corporate environment 
allows them to do so effectively (see, for a similar argument, Bakan, 
2004; Sutton, 2007). In fact, historians have made the argument that 
many examples of bad leadership over history can be traced to psy-
chopathic personalities, including Hitler, Stalin, and even Napoleon 
(e.g., Neumayr, 1995).
The concept of economic man resembles the psychopath in that it 
assumes that humans are exclusively motivated by the drive to acquire 
and the drive to defend. In effect, therefore, the drive to bond with fellow 
humans and the drive to comprehend and make sense of the world only 
exist as secondary drives to ful"ll the former two. In contrast, the RD 
theory supports a humanistic view in that we have four independent 
underlying natural drives that need to be continually balanced. While 
the drives to acquire and to defend still remain viable and important 
factors in determining human behavior, the drive to bond with fellow 
humans and the drive to comprehend are also strong independent forces. 
RD theory thus provides a humanistic understanding of behavior. It is 
also able to provide higher level insight with regard to organizational 
principles and decision-making. Furthermore, it can be rigorously tested 
by natural science. We will examine below what the implications of this 
humanistic paradigm (based on RD theory) are for organizations and 
societies (e.g., Bakan, 2004).
The Humanistic View of the Firm
Business Strategy. The humanistic view of organizations and "rms 
(Mele, 2008: 15), in contrast to the economistic perspective, is that they 
are much more than mere sets of contracts or mechanisms for pro"t 
creation. This is consistent with some of the foundational work in the 
knowledge-based view of the "rm (Kogut & Zander, 1996), where it is 
argued that "rms exist not only for coordination but for learning and 
identity building purposes. Humanism views organizations as a social 
phenomenon essential to the relational nature of human beings. Because 
humans have a need for friendly and cooperative relationships, human-
istic organizations embrace a balance of qualitatively desirable outcomes. 
Firms, therefore, aim to support the individual drives for acquisition, 
bonding, comprehending, and defending at the same time. In fact, 
when "rms do that, they not only better motivate their employees and 
other stakeholders, but they also produce more desirable organizational 
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results (Nohria, Groysberg, & Eling-Lee, 2008). In the humanistic view, 
we assume ever changing adaptive processes, not stable utility functions. 
Discourse-based social processes, therefore, are central to the notion 
of organizing and supporting the creation of mutual goals. The aim of 
these processes is to achieve a balance, and therefore any imperative for 
the maximization of one single objective (such as shareholder value) is 
rejected. In light of RD theory, a corporation aiming to maximize !-
nancial value is akin to a psychopathic individual aiming to ful!ll only 
the drive to acquire without needing to ful!ll the drive to bond. In the 
end, it will be unsustainable and un!t for survival, as can be witnessed 
in the recent !nancial crisis.
The universal ambition of humanism requires that multiple objec-
tives are integrated and harmonized. Shared value creation processes 
are theoretically and practically imperative; a balance between multiple 
stakeholders and between short- and long-term interests is essential. At 
best, humanistic organizing endorses a satis!cing or holistic optimizing 
strategy (Frederick, Davis, & James, 1988; Simon, 1979, 1982) around 
goals that bene!t humanity at large (e.g., well-being creation).
Governance. In contrast to governance theories based on agency 
theory, humanistic governance theories such as trusteeship or steward-
ship theory focus on reinforcing the other-regarding positive aspects of 
human nature (Blair, 1995; Blair & Stout, 1999; Turnbull, 2002). Accord-
ing to Davis, Schoorman, and Donaldson (1997), stewardship theory as-
sumes intrinsically motivated human beings that are driven mainly by 
higher-order needs such as social and self-actualization needs (Maslow, 
1954). Stewards are guided by the intention to serve all stakeholders, and 
they demonstrate a high level of commitment to total value creation, 
focus on long-term results, and an equitable distribution of rewards to all 
stakeholders. As such, governance mechanisms focus more on strategic 
support for the steward and less on hierarchical control. Economistic 
types of top-down control (such as time clocks, monitoring systems, 
etc.) are thus deemed detrimental to the motivation and performance 
of stakeholders (Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Macus, 2002; Muth & Don-
aldson, 1998). Checks and balances systems are essential in humanistic 
organizational structures so that power abuse can be prevented. Law-
rence (2007a) argues that checks and balances arrangements, rather than 
hierarchical control, parallel the function of the prefrontal cortex in the 
human brain. That is why he argues that checks and balances systems 
(such as those instituted in the U.S. Constitution) are better able to ful!ll 
the role of representing all major stakeholders in strategic decisions. Akin 
to democratic institutions, humanistic organizations can use different 
stakeholder councils (e.g., worker councils) to prevent decisions that favor 
one group over the other in the long term. These internal checks and 
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balances will mutually reinforce each other to serve various stakeholder 
needs in a balanced form (see also Gratton, 2004).
Structures. While economistic structures aim to reduce transaction 
costs, humanistic organizational structures, on the contrary, center on 
the development of human capabilities and effectiveness. To enable 
individual growth, humanistic structures reduce authority levels in the 
organization, allowing employees to enjoy high levels of responsibility. In 
humanistic organizations, decision rights are spread throughout the en-
tire organization in a way that utilizes the expertise of all employees. To 
further use the capabilities of employees, humanistic organizations em-
ploy integrative mechanisms that cut across the vertical lines of control, 
e.g., product or project managers, task forces, matrix elements, innovative 
information management systems. Such structural elements help to keep 
the focus on over-all organizational goals but also provide opportunities 
for employees to put meaning into their work and ful!ll their drive to 
comprehend (dC) and extend their bonded network of trust (dB).
In humanistic !rms, the use of intrinsic motivational levers is pri-
oritized, especially those aimed at normative and hedonic intrinsic 
drives (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Gottschalg & Zollo, 2007; Lindenberg, 2001). 
Incentives are usually tied to holistic organizational goals, reward not 
only the individual but also the team, and are primarily tied to long-
term organizational goals. These methods prevent an over-stimulation 
of competitive (dA) drives compared to collaborative drives (dB).
Leadership. What Bass and Avolio (1994) term transformational lead-
ership !ts well with a humanistic view of leadership. Transformational 
leaders actively balance their four personal drives and also engage their 
followers to do so. Based on moral values, transformational leaders in-
spire followers, stimulate them intellectually, and engage them emotion-
ally with organizational tasks. They base their in"uence on the power 
of the argument rather than on hierarchy, and demonstrate care for the 
individual follower and his personal development. Transformational, 
humanistic, or four-drive leaders are able to create a climate in which 
people clearly understand cognitively and embrace emotionally the 
purpose of the organization (drive to comprehend), are able to maintain 
very positive long-term relationships with each other (drive to bond), 
create !nancial value (drive to acquire), and can count on their collec-
tive strength to weather the storms of competition (drive to defend). 
But humanistic leaders do not only stop acting and in"uencing within 
their own organization. They act as responsible stewards of the economy 
and society at large (Hernandez, 2008; Sitkin, Lind, & Siang, 2006), 
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and are enabled and compelled by their active four drives to contribute 
to a society that is balancing the four drives as well. Lawrence (2007), 
therefore, argues for a much more active role of business leaders in the 
public policy process—not, as is currently seen, in terms of a laser focus 
on !rm pro!tability (dA), but rather in terms of creating a balance in 
society among all four drives.
Culture. Unsurprisingly, the different paradigm also contributes to 
the creation of distinctive organizational cultures. Humanistic organiza-
tions support cultures that are more transformational in nature, and cre-
ate organizational identities based on inter-human relations (relational) 
and which are inclusive of a larger group (communal) (Brickson, 2007). 
They are driven by all four human drives and they create balanced 
cultures. The humanistic organizational culture is organic, circular, 
constantly changing and evolving, and engages with outside forces as 
parameters of internal action. As it thrives from the exchange with the 
outside, it fosters constant dialogue with and amongst its stakeholders 
and is guided by a dialogically generated set of values (Dierksmeier & 
Pirson, 2010; Pirson & Lawrence, 2010). Not only does it balance the four 
drives of internal stakeholder groups, but it also aims at contributing to 
a balance of the four drives for external stakeholders. Google, Nucor, 
Medtronics, and the Grameen Bank can be seen as typical organizations 
with four-drive cultures.
View of the Societal System
In the humanistic perspective, individuals, organizations, and the 
state all play important roles in balancing the four drives. As there needs 
to be a balance on each level respectively, there is no real division of 
labor in terms of ful!lling the four basic drives. Rather, there is coopera-
tion in terms of ensuring that the checks and balances enable an optimal 
balance of the four drives on all levels. In the humanistic view, personal 
morality is connected with responsibility for systemic consequences. 
Business leaders accept and assume responsibility for the consequences 
of their actions on the systemic, organizational, and individual levels. As 
such, organizations engage with the outside and view responsibility to 
stakeholders as elementary for conducting business. Liberty is contingent 
on morality; individual and organizational freedom materialize through 
care and concern for the other. Sustainability and corporate responsibil-
ity are endorsed parameters in the humanistic view of business; attempts 
to alleviate social problems through business are imperative. Only in 
mutual responsibility for individuals, organizations, and the wider sys-
tem is a balance of the four drives possible (see also Table 1).
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Paradigm Economism Humanism
Individual Level 
Model Homo Oeconomicus Zoon Politikon
Motivation
Two-drive motivated
Drive to acquiret
Drive to defendt
Four-drive motivated
Drive to acquiret
Drive to bondt
Drive to comprehendt
Drive to defend t
Goal Maximization of utility Balance of interests
Disposition Transactional Relational
View of other Means to an end Means and end
Organizational Level
Organization Nexus of contracts Social community
Governance Shareholder oriented Stakeholder oriented
Model in 
management 
theory
Agent Steward
Leadership 
style Transactional Transformational
Goal setting Command and control based Discourse based
Goal Pro!t maximization
Financial, social, 
and environmental 
sustainability
Motivation 
incentives
Geared to 1st and 2nd 
order needs (Maslow)
Drive to acquiret
Drive to defendt  
Geared to 3rd and 4th order 
needs (Maslow)
Drive to acquiret
Drive to bondt
Drive to comprehendt
Drive to defendt
Culture Mechanistic Organic
Time frame Short term Long term
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Systemic Level
State  
orientation 
to business
 Laissez faire  Subsidiary actor
State  
managerial  
responsibility
Financial value creation Supporting a  balanced society
TABLE 1:  Economism and Humanism (adapted f rom P i r son and 
Lawrence, 2009)
THE NOTION OF HUMANISTIC MANAGEMENT
Within the humanistic paradigm, we develop the notion of human-
istic management, which we consider the intra- and inter-personal ap-
proach to creating and supporting the !rm. It is, as such, not a theory 
of the !rm, but a theory about the practice of the !rm. We suggest that 
this theory for the practice of management can be applied to sustainable 
business management and to all aspects of decision-making that aspire 
to be more humanistic and ethical. The following perspective has been 
developed and re!ned through an iterative process between theory and 
practice. During that process, we researched a sample of 19 companies 
that were suggested by experts as “humanistic” organizations, in a global 
search process with a focus on two elements: social value generation and 
!nancial value generation (refer to Table 2). The case studies that were 
developed were guided by the questions of why and how the selected 
organizations could be economically successful while contributing to 
positive social development. Case studies focused on strategies, business 
philosophy, organizational culture, leadership, and management practices 
and processes. Such case examples were curated from around the globe 
and represent a variety of industries. As such, we hope to have a broad 
base for our conclusions.
Company Location Size Industry
1 ABN Amro Banco Real 
Latin America 
(Brazil)
Big / 
National
Financial  
Services
2 AES Corporation
North America 
(USA) 
Big / 
Global
Industrial 
Goods
3 Broad Air Conditioning Asia (China) 
Big / 
Global
Industrial 
Goods
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4 Brummer and BracNet Asia (Bangladesh)
Small / 
National Services
5 Cascade Pulp and Paper
North America 
(Canada) 
Big / 
Global
Industrial 
Goods
6 DM Europe (Germany) Big / National Services
7 Grameen Danone Asia (Bangladesh) 
Small / 
National
Consumer 
Goods
8
Hongfei 
Metal 
Limited
Asia (China) Small / National
Industrial 
Goods
9 Level Trading North America (Canada)
Small / 
National
Consumer 
Goods
10
Micromatic 
Grinding 
Technologies
Asia (Based in India) Big / National
Industrial 
Goods
11 Mondragon Europe (Spain) Big / National Conglomerate
12 Novo Nordisk Europe (Denmark) 
Big / 
Global 
Consumer 
Goods
13 Sekem Afrika (Egypt) Small / Regional
Consumer 
Goods
14 Semco Latin America (Brazil) 
Big / 
National Conglomerate
15 Sonae Sierra Europe (Portugal) Big / Global
Industrial 
Goods
Company Location Size Industry
16 Tata Group Asia (India) Big / Global Conglomerate
17 Terracycle North America (USA)
Small / 
National
Consumer 
Goods
18
Wainwright 
Bank and 
Trust
North America 
(USA) 
Small / 
National
Financial  
Services
19 Zipcar North America (USA)
Small / 
National Services
TABLE 2: Overview of Humanistic Businesses Analyzed (adapted from 
Kimakowitz et al., 2010)
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Based on our analysis, we understand humanistic management as pos-
sessing three interrelated dimensions. First, humanistic managers exhibit 
an unconditional respect for the dignity of every person as the founda-
tion for interpersonal interaction. Second, they actively integrate ethical 
re!ection into their business decisions. Third, humanistic managers aim 
to establish normative legitimacy for corporate activities through stake-
holder engagement. Taken together, these three dimensions ultimately 
promote human !ourishing and present a basis for a globally sustainable 
business practice.
Unconditional Respect Towards Human Dignity
Managers in the selected sample knowingly or tacitly agreed that part 
of what makes us human is our shared vulnerability. Humanistic man-
agement, therefore, means the fundamental acceptance that the conditio 
humana entails our shared need for the protection of said dignity. Such 
respect is expressed in the unconditional protection against exploitation 
and instrumentalization. As Immanuel Kant noted, every human must 
always be seen as an end in itself, and never as a mere means:
Everything has either a price or a dignity. Whatever has a price can be 
replaced by something else as its equivalent; on the other hand, whatever 
is above all price, and therefore admits of no equivalent, has a dignity. But 
that which constitutes the condition under which alone something can be 
an end in itself does not have mere relative worth, i.e., price, but an intrinsic 
worth, i.e., a dignity. (Kant, 1785)
This presents a challenge to the general notion of input-output, 
economistically oriented management. Such an orientation entails a 
tendency to objectify human beings (as human resources); managers 
in!uence the managed in favor of prede"ned objectives, thus turning 
them into a means to achieve an end, and reduce people to little more 
than the equivalent of a piece of machinery. Managers in humanistically 
oriented companies aim to see every individual as an end in itself. While 
they do not dispute that people need to be instrumental in production 
processes in order for a business to thrive, they provide mechanisms of 
choice so that people autonomously assume their roles as the result of a 
self-determined process. Only then are they not instrumentalized in their 
human capacity; instead, they themselves are assuming an instrumental 
role within their job. The utilization of people in humanistic manage-
ment, therefore, is always limited to the role a person assumes, never to 
the person itself. Enlightened managers thus understand that people will 
only become instruments to businesses which they consider aligned to 
their personal values (i.e., sustainable businesses).
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An example of corporate practice that values individual autonomy 
and allows for a high degree of self-determination is the Brazilian con-
glomerate Semco, which has roughly $200 million in annual turnover, 
about 3,000 employees, and enjoys over a decade of yearly double digit 
growth. At Semco, employees quite literally choose their jobs within the 
company. In addition, they form ad-hoc committees and task groups 
that address speci!c issues. These groups are formed without manage-
rial supervision and anyone who wants to contribute to the topic in 
question can join. The founder of Semco, Ricardo Semler, attributes a 
great deal of the company’s success to its humanistic foundations: “our 
insistence [is] that workers seek personal challenges and satisfaction be-
fore trying to meet the company’s goal” (Largacha, 2010). They want to 
give people room for exploration and self-discovery. “Once employees 
feel challenged, invigorated, and productive, their efforts will naturally 
translate into pro!t and growth for the organization.” In simpler terms, 
Semler states that “we don’t make our employees ask permission to go 
to the bathroom … we get out of their way and let them do their jobs” 
(Largacha, 2010).
Integrating Ethical Concerns into Managerial Decisions
Humanistic managers do not think insularly, and they understand 
that the respect for human dignity is re"ected in a business’s impact on 
society at large. In its broader context, humanistic management challeng-
es traditional corporate responsibility as mere rhetoric if it does not inte-
grate ethical concerns. Ethical means examining decisions that impact 
others in terms of their consequences for all those affected. Humanistic 
management, therefore, criticizes one-dimensional managerial objectives 
such as pro!t maximization because the decisions are evaluated mostly 
in terms of impact for shareholders. That is when economic rationality 
becomes incompatible with protecting human dignity. A humanistic 
convergence exists whenever there is room for the balancing of inter-
ests of stakeholders based on the quality of the arguments articulated. 
In Habermasian words, when factual power overrides argumentative 
power—as any paradigm that proclaims the maximization of particular 
interests demands—minority interests are excluded and suppressed from 
consideration (Habermas, 1998; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). Humanistic 
managers, therefore, de!ne economic success criteria as being inclusive 
of all stakeholders, often around the notion of the common good or 
well-being creation.
Spain’s seventh largest company, a cooperative called Mondragon, 
provides a rich example of the integration of ethical evaluations and 
stakeholder concerns into managerial decision making. Employees at 
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Mondragon are owners of the !rm, and believe that they are in busi-
ness together with consumers, suppliers, and the community; they are 
oriented towards serving society, and derive motivation and joy from 
serving the common good rather than shareholders. As a consequence, 
a business that does not serve the common good is not worth pursuing 
for Mondragon, despite potential pro!tability. This approach leads to 
the integration of ethical concerns into managerial decision making as 
part of the organization’s DNA, and not as an afterthought, e.g., under a 
risk management perspective (Kasmir, 1996). Furthermore, such an ap-
proach satis!es all four motivational drives in that it creates a safe (dD) 
and friendly (dB) environment in which income can be earned and a 
higher purpose is served (dC) (Moellner, 2010).
The Dialogical Extension of Managerial Ethical Reflection
The integration alone of ethical re"ection into business decisions can 
be seen as a monological process in which the decision-maker might, in 
all sincerity, fail to see the concerns of others, leading to what we may 
call honest mistakes. Humanistic managers, therefore, seek normative 
legitimacy to ensure that the outcomes of (monological) ethical re"ec-
tion are tested by entering into a dialogue with those who may chal-
lenge any aspect of a business’s conduct. This third guiding principle 
is critical with regard to global sustainability concerns. The lonesome 
managerial decision about whether a certain action is ethically sound 
is thereby transferred to the “moral site” of stakeholder dialogue, where 
the manager shares the responsibility with the stakeholder in embark-
ing on a course of action that is acceptable to both parties. This is how 
businesses gain normative legitimacy, especially with regard to social 
and environmental impact.
Legitimacy can be considered the general recognition of an entity’s 
conduct as desirable or apposite within a system of norms and values. 
Humanistic management bestows legitimacy if the normative evalua-
tion of an organization and its activities results in the perception that 
it is “doing the right thing with the right intention.” This differentiates 
normative legitimacy from pragmatic legitimacy, for while the former is 
based on values and reason, the latter can be based on mere self-interest 
and strategic business calculus (e.g., the business case). As Max Weber 
pointed out, seeking legitimacy helps determine the choice of means for 
an exercise (Weber, 1978: 214). The sincere seeking of legitimacy, there-
fore, forces a company to continuously assess its conduct, to rationally 
justify its behavior and compare it to expectations and the desirability 
of its impact on society, and this is best achieved in a dialogue between 
all those affected. The world market leader in insulin production, Novo 
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Nordisk, has radically shifted its business model towards one where 
shared responsibility and legitimacy seeking through stakeholder dia-
logues take center stage. Following an initial stakeholder model in the 
1990s where Novo Nordisk perceived itself as the center of a stakeholder 
universe with various prede!ned stakeholders around it, they changed 
their perspective towards a re"ective stakeholder model. In its current 
form, Novo Nordisk sees itself as one point of intersection in a dynamic 
web of stakeholders. Under its re"ective model, Novo Nordisk aims to 
increase transparency so that stakeholders can gain access to the infor-
mation they are interested in. As a result, the company gains legitimacy 
and simultaneously learns about the issues that are of interest to its 
stakeholders while it enables an open dialogue based on mutual learning 
and the desire to improve the company’s performance (Palacios, Pirson, 
& Bader, 2010).
In short, humanistic management is the pursuit of strategies and 
practices that seek to create sustainable human well-being. Humanistic 
management derives its legitimacy from the preservation of human 
dignity in business through the submission of its practices to societal 
critique. By engaging in an open dialogue about the values that should 
serve business as criteria for assessing managerial success, corporate 
decision-makers realize that the value proposition of business is ul-
timately to serve people rather than to make money. The shift from 
one-dimensional pro!t maximization towards a multidimensional and 
value-integrative understanding of corporate success is as necessary today 
as it is imminent.
HUMANISTIC MANAGEMENT AS PRACTICE
The various case examples studied show how businesses can unite 
social value generation with !nancial success and become role models 
for sustainable business. In addition to the three elements of humanistic 
management, we found additional insights that can help sustainable 
business practice:
The companies are steadfastly purpose-based. Their pur-t
pose provides the platform needed for the autonomous 
individual to make decisions for the organization’s ben-
e!t. The purpose is a universally sharable, legitimacy-
inducing goal, providing stakeholders with a reason for 
wanting the company to succeed. In turn, the company 
can count on motivated employees, loyal customers, 
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trusting business partners, and a high degree of goodwill 
from other stakeholders.
Humanistic management styles as implemented in these t
cases aim to promote human development, which includes 
psychological, physical, social, and !nancial dimensions. 
Humanistic management is learning oriented. There is no t
state of perfection, only a constant drive to improve and 
organically evolve.
The businesses provide for decentralized structures based t
on trust, allowing members autonomy while providing a 
suf!cient level of integration to create a sense of commu-
nity. Humanistic management structures are modeled after 
democratic systems that create checks and balances, and 
thus guard against the imbalances of a corporate control 
and command structure. In general, managers in these 
businesses assume that trust is reciprocal—one needs to 
show trust to gain trust—and that at one stage in the !rm’s 
development, management made a leap of faith, trusting 
their employees and business partners and gaining their 
trust in return. This allowed management to do away with 
control mechanisms that impede creativity, innovation, 
productive interpersonal interactions, and that inflict 
transaction costs.
Managers in these !rms are “servant leaders” and regard t
themselves as stewards for the greater good. They are of-
ten spiritually grounded, self-effacing, and humble. They 
see their roles as being guardians of a culture of dignity, 
and serve as co-developers of a learning community. Hu-
manistic leaders do not see the need to dominate others 
to experience grati!cation in their career, but derive great 
satisfaction from being able to share their passions and 
convictions with their communities. They are grateful for, 
and excited about, the opportunity that they have been 
given to contribute in creating a better world.
CONCLUSION
If we, as management academics, want to help solve the current 
crises, we need to go back to the fundamentals. We need to question 
the understanding of how we view ourselves as human beings and how 
we build organizations based upon that understanding. The proposed 
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humanistic paradigm for the development of a renewed theory of the 
!rm is only a starting point, but it is !rmly rooted in tradition, culture, 
and in philosophy as well, and is supported by increasing amounts of 
scienti!c evidence. However, much of that evidence is scattered, and so 
much more rigorous, ingenious, and interdisciplinary studies need to be 
conducted. To that end, we need to work more across disciplinary bound-
aries to better understand these fundamental issues. Moreover, we also 
need to cross not only academic boundaries but boundaries in practice 
and policy as well. We need to work outside of academic purviews and 
allow research to focus on the problems of practitioners with regard to 
solving the current crises. When doing so, we need to take seriously the 
boundaries and logics established by institutional arrangements. Many 
of the structural setups are a consequence of the current paradigm and 
we need to be able to propose superior alternatives.
One of the main barriers that needs to be overcome is the depth to 
which the economistic view has penetrated minds and hearts regarding 
the dark side of business and management. We need not only to propose 
alternative paradigms but support the creation of an alternative human-
centered narrative of business as well. In order to achieve that, we need 
to !nd, create, and tell different stories about business. As academics, 
we might, therefore, need to collaborate more with the media in order 
to penetrate mainstream opinion more effectively. There are many more 
businesses adopting sustainable business strategies that serve people and 
the planet. Teaching such case examples and providing insights into 
such companies, as well as conducting research with them (i.e., social 
enterprises), could enhance efforts to protect our species.
A lot of challenges undoubtedly lie ahead for those concerned with 
solving the current crises. The scope and scale of change involved in 
re-designing our economic system are so grand that only collaborative 
efforts can hope to be successful. Under the auspices of the Humanistic 
Management Network (www.humanetwork.org) and its various chap-
ters and centers, we are reaching out to academics, practitioners, and 
policy makers who are interested to work together. From reconceptual-
izing management theory to teaching better management theory and 
practice, from advising and consulting with businesses to employ more 
enlightened approaches to advising policy makers to set the framework 
for sustainable business practices, there lies much work ahead, and we 
are looking forward to collaborating. As such, we want to conclude with 
an invitation to be in touch with us through info@humanetwork.org.
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